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Abstract — With the mutual consent to use WSDL (Web Service 
Description Language) to describe web service interfaces and 
SOAP as the basic communication protocol, the cornerstone for 
web service-oriented architecture (WSOA) has been established. 
Considering the momentum observable by the growing number 
of specifications in the web service domain for the indispensable 
cross-cutting concern of identity management (IdM) it is still an 
open issue how a WSOA-aware IdM architecture is built and 
how it is linked with WSOA’s main elements, the web services 
providing functional core concerns. In this paper we present an 
access control model for WSOA and a blueprint of a WSOA-
aware authorization verification service which is part of the IdM 
architecture. We show the integration of this service with WSOA 
consisting of both basic and composite web services. Our solution 
has been tested and evaluated in an implementation case study. 
Keywords — Access Control Model, Identity Management 
(IdM), Web Service-Oriented Architecture (WSOA), Metamodel, 
Policy Decision Point (PDP), Business Process Execution 
Language (BPEL) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Background 
Currently most enterprises try to align their business 
processes with the supporting IT by migrating towards web 
service-oriented architecture (WSOA). Web service 
technologies are commonly recognized as a promising way for 
the implementation of SOA. However, WSOA is not meant to 
be built from scratch but rather the functionality of existing 
systems and their components have to be leveraged to web 
services. Bottom-up approaches start with the existing software 
systems and ease traditional application integration: web 
services feature standardized interfaces described using WSDL 
(Web Service Definition Language) as well as a standardized 
communication protocol, namely SOAP, which both are 
commonly accepted. The integration process can then be 
applied by the composition of web services of heterogeneous 
underlying software systems using process execution languages 
like BPEL (Business Process Execution Language) [1]. Top-
down approaches start with business processes and focus at 
their model-driven mapping down to basic and composite web 
services. They enable business analysts to perform so-called 
programming-in-the-large, the system-independent 
orchestration of business-related (web) services along business 
processes [2]. 
B. Motivation 
Besides the development of WSOA’s core concerns (cf. to 
aspect-oriented programming, [3]) there are several cross-
cutting concerns that have to be addressed before being able to 
go productive with WSOA – a central one is to enable security, 
especially access control. Access control consists of 
authentication and authorization verification. Looking at the 
mass and complexity of the existing and upcoming 
specifications in the web service security area like WS-
Security, WS-Trust, SAML, XACML or the Liberty Alliance’s 
stack proposal, it is comprehensible that software developers 
often neglect the web service security part. Additionally, state-
of-the-art IdM suites are not yet prepared for WSOA [4] as 
well as current application servers often do not as yet support a 
necessary combination of relevant IdM standards. This is why 
currently the existing web services in most cases have little or 
no security features. Complications even increase when 
composing several web services which provide functionality 
from different underlying applications – workarounds like 
using the applications’ built-in IdM are no longer applicable; 
an overall IdM architecture for WSOA is needed. 
In this paper we enhance and improve existing access 
control models in respect to WSOA. The development of an 
appropriate access control model is a highly relevant 
prerequisite because the migration towards WSOA implies a 
strongly increasing number of objects (i.e. web services) 
combined with a looser coupling between subjects and objects. 
State-of-the-art models like role-based access control (RBAC) 
[5] do not scale in WSOA and need to be enhanced [6]. 
Secondly, we present an architectural blueprint for a WSOA-
aware IdM authorization verification service following this 
access control model and motivate its integration with 
WSOA’s core concern part. Therefore we extend the view on 
WSOA from the functional perspective towards access control. 
Leveraging the functionality of existing applications to 
interoperable services interfaces using application servers (so-
called “wrapping to web services”) allows the composition of 
these web services, technically implemented using process 
execution environments like BPEL engines. Though slicing 
down existing applications for the encapsulation of their core 
functionality at service interfaces, access control has to be 
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enforced – at least to the same extent as it has been previously 
within the application boundaries. 
The contributions of this paper are: 
1. An access control metamodel for WSOA revealing all 
relevant sets and relations necessary to calculate 
authorization verification requests. The goal is to respect 
WSOA-specifics like the loose coupling of basic and 
composite web services as well as the increasing amount 
of both subjects and objects – a fact that prevents scaling 
of existing models. 
2. A WSOA-aware authorization verification service 
implemented as a policy decision point (PDP) applying our 
access control model. This service is a central element of 
the IdM architecture needed to enforce access control for 
WSOA’s core concern services, both basic and composite. 
From the core concern perspective, the complexity of the 
IdM architecture is to be encapsulated at a minimum set of 
service interfaces which should not have domain-specific 
characteristics. 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 introduces the 
architecture of web service-oriented architecture (WSOA) and 
derives the requirements for an appropriate access control 
model and the corresponding IdM architecture. In section 3 we 
discuss related work on access control models and propose our 
enhancement towards WSOA. In section 4 we motivate the 
design of a WSOA-aware authorization verification service 
implementing our access control model; the integration with 
WSOA’s core concern part is explained. In section 5, our 
approach is applied and evaluated in a case study. A conclusion 
and an outlook on future work in this area close the body of the 
paper. 
II. WEB SERVICE-ORIENTED ARCHITECTURE AND 
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR IDENTITY MANAGEMENT 
To be able to derive requirements for an access control 
model for web service-oriented architecture (WSOA), an 
overview of the architecture of WSOA’s core concern 
structure is given in this section. 
A. Basics of Web Service-Oriented Architecture 
The basic WSOA layering as depicted in figure 1 consists 
of existing applications at the bottom layer that are wrapped to 
(basic) web services. The wrapping is done using application 
servers applying the design patterns proxy or façade as 
described in [7]. Web services can be composed at an 
integration layer using BPEL and web portals are used to 
integrate the (human) users utilizing existing web technology 
like web browsers. A key driver for WSOA is the closer 
alignment of business processes with their supporting IT. This 
is why the focus in IT changes from the (internal) view on 
systems and application towards operated and quality-assured 
IT services [8]; as a result, the aforementioned further layers 
are introduced and put on top of the existing applications. 
These services are defined at standardized interfaces at the 
basic web services and the integration layer using the UML 
ball / socket notation combined with a WSDL/SOAP 
constraint (cf. figure 1). Using standardized interfaces eases 
the traditional integration process especially in heterogeneous 
environments, i.e. with existing applications of different 
brands with vendor-specific and incompatible interfaces, 
depicted at the legacy systems at the bottom of figure 1. 
Additionally it allows flexible service reuse in different 
business processes. The description of this common core of 
WSOA can be found in many publications [9, 10, 11, 12]. 
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Figure 1. Architecture of 
Web Service-Oriented Architecture 
It is important to notice that in the web service context, 
SOA does not imply strict layering. Web services can be 
accessed either directly or via one or many intermediaries like 
BPEL engines. From WSOA’s viewpoint the service interface 
of a BPEL-composed web service is not distinguishable from 
a basic one as they are both described using WSDL. 
B. Requirements for Identity Management 
Besides further enhancements of WSOA’s core concern 
part, fundamental questions arise: how is access control to be 
handled in this highly distributed and service-oriented 
environment? Slicing down existing applications to business 
related services, the internal IdM structures of the legacy 
systems are cut off. The alignment of the different system-
specific IdM access control models and techniques with the 
goal of a local handling inside the applications complicates the 
integrated view on identity management. Therefore the 
development of a WSOA-wide, cross-cutting IdM architecture 
is favored. Being SOA-aware itself, this architecture is meant 
to expose its functionality at service interfaces decoupling core 
concerns from IdM, especially access control [13]. Following 
the paradigm of lose coupling [9] and separation of concerns 
[14], the IdM part of SOA’s core concern services should be 
reduced to the bare minimum. 
Access control is based on two prerequisites: first of all, an 
authentication process checking any possible credentials. This 
can be done once with validity for a series of subsequent 
accesses (relates to a single sign-on approach) or on every 
access. User authentication can be handled at WSOA’s portal 
layer and will not be discussed further in this paper. Secondly, 
an authorization verification process is needed which checks if 
permission has been granted for the authenticated subject to 
invoke a WSOA service. In the following we will focus on this 
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process which is to be encapsulated to a service of the IdM 
architecture. 
Basic and composite services should not be put in charge 
of verifying caller’s authorization themselves but they are to 
be enabled to clearly separate this task from their core 
concerns towards an authorization verification service. 
Therefore they should hand over all relevant data (according 
to our WSOA access control model) to the authorization 
verification service allowing each application server and 
BPEL engine to handle access control by calling the 
authorization service of the IdM architecture as depicted in 
figure 1. 
III. AN ACCESS CONTROL METAMODEL FOR 
WEB SERVICE-ORIENTED ARCHITECTURE 
One major goal of identity management is to establish 
effective access control that is the restriction of access to 
resources. To enable access control in WSOA, an access 
control model has to be developed adhering to WSOA’s 
specifics. We describe this model as a conceptual metamodel. 
This metamodel defines the sets and relations on which a 
concrete access control decision can take place. 
A. Related Work on Access Control Models 
Formal access control models build the mathematical 
foundation to restrict access to resources. In 1969, the basics 
of access control were described very abstractly but formally 
for the first time [15]. Here the concepts of “subjects” and 
“objects” were introduced and it was suggested to link them 
using an “access matrix”. This paradigm is now referred to as 
identity-based access control (IBAC) as the permissions are 
linked directly to the identity (i.e. the identifier) of the 
requesting subject without further levels of indirection. 
Efforts to develop a complete mathematical formulation of 
access control have been undertaken in the early 1970s [16, 
17]. Most of this work was sponsored by US defense sector. 
The common sense at this point of time was that there is a set 
of active entities, called subjects, and a set of passive (i.e. 
protected) entities, called objects. To control the access to 
objects, “security policies” were introduced basically 
consisting of two elements; first the type of access request: if 
“observation” (i.e. read) and / or if “alteration” (i.e. write / 
append) was requested. Secondly, an ordered set of security 
classification (e.g. unclassified, confidential, secret, top secret) 
was combined with a set of formal categories. A pair of 
classification and category was called “security level”. Access 
control required a subject’s security level to dominate the 
security level of the object. These models are called lattice-
based access control (LBAC). In [18] their limitations are 
revealed: LBAC models are only effective for certain 
coarsely-grained security scenarios like in the military and 
lack both flexibility and scalability. 
To overcome these limitations, the next step in evolution is 
role-based access control (RBAC) as introduced in [19] and 
refined in [5, 20, 21]. Although there are many different forms 
of RBAC, all RBAC models have in common that there is a 
level of indirection in the subject / object relation by focusing 
the business role which a subject is performing. Access 
permissions of an object are then linked to roles instead of 
individual subjects. Because access permissions do not have to 
be repeatedly assigned and maintained on a basis of individual 
subjects – a number that is constantly increasing – RBAC both 
significantly reduces administration overhead and scales much 
better than both IBAC and LBAC. 
With software engineering heading for WSOA the 
traditional access control models need to be put to test again. 
In WSOA, the amount of objects to be protected increases 
significantly. Additionally the subject / object relation, 
instantiated in a consumer / provider link, is meant to be much 
more loosely coupled. In [6] a new access control model 
called attribute-based access control (ABAC) is introduced. 
Unlike IBAC and RBAC, in the ABAC model permissions are 
defined merely on any security relevant characteristics of 
subjects and objects, known as attributes. The goal is to almost 
completely decouple the subject / object relation by 
independently defining attributes of subjects, objects and 
environment state. It is a logical enhancement of IBAC and 
RBAC as the identity itself as well as the roles can be mapped 
to attributes. Policies on different abstraction levels that are 
defined on regular expressions consisting of attributes of 
subjects, objects and environment parameters enforce access 
control. 
B. Heading for a WSOA-aware Access Control Metamodel 
A problem shared by all aforementioned models is that the 
“action” is always reduced to basic system operations like 
read, write, delete, execute etc. This is problematic in WSOA 
as there the objects to be protected are at a different 
granularity. The most atomic object to restrict access to is a 
web service operation. It is important to notice that the web 
service operations are more similar to functions in 
programming languages that are executed with a defined set of 
parameters than like simple data objects that are manipulated. 
Therefore the set of actions as defined in RBAC has to be 
refined. In the web service context, it is not enough to define 
access to a web service operation based on a combination of 
permissions like read, write or execute. For example, a subject 
might be allowed to invoke a web service operation allowing 
the retrieval of personal data – but only if this is personal data 
about the caller himself. Hence, the parameters of the web 
service operation invocation must also be considered in the 
access control model as well. Basically this enhances the 
traditional RBAC actions which can be mapped to the fixed 
value of execute but additionally takes the invocation 
parameters into consideration for access control. A problem of 
ABAC as described in [6] is the indirection between objects 
and their access permissions. This unnecessary indirection 
increases complexity as the development of appropriate 
“loosely-coupled” policies is difficult 
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Figure 2. Metamodel for Access Control in Web Service-Oriented Architecture 
 
A further specific of WSOA which must be dealt with is 
explicit service composition. Composition takes place if a web 
service calls different other web service operations and returns 
a combined result. The access restriction to the composed 
service has to be at least the sum of the restrictions of all 
underlying operations it is composed of and that are invoked 
mandatorily. This allows checking authorization at an earlier 
stage (i.e. the BPEL-composed web service) thereby limiting 
unnecessary calls ending in rollback operations if particular 
permissions for invoked basic web service operations are 
missing. 
In figure 2 we present our metamodel for access control in 
web service-oriented architecture (WSOA) using a conceptual 
model in the UML 2.0 metamodeling approach to define the 
sets and relations used to enforce access control. This 
conceptual model is the first step towards development of a 
UML profile which can be used for a model-driven 
development of access control policies, which is not the focus 
of this paper. Our metamodel is an enhancement of the 
combination of hierarchical RBAC [5] and ABAC [6]. 
The central element of this model is Policy which is the 
composition of Permissions. Permission itself defines the 
traditional Subject / Object relation for a single service usage 
context. Permissions are always positive in our metamodel 
conferring to the ability of a subject (characterized by its 
attributes) to perform some action on the associated object. In 
access control literature negative permissions which deny 
rather than confer access to an object are sometimes discussed. 
In our metamodel denial of access is the default behavior and 
if a permission is granted, it has to be modeled explicitly. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to use negations in Permission’s 
constraints. Permission combines one Object (related via the 
Policy towards which it is aggregated) and a set of Subject 
Attributes with the possibility to have constraints considering 
the Object’s associated Input Parameters and the Environment 
State (like date, time or any other attribute related to neither 
Subject nor Object). There are some special Subject Attributes 
that we explicitly modeled as the subject’s Identifier, the 
Credentials and a Security Token (which is of temporary 
validity, i.e. refers to a session context). 
In WSOA, Subjects can be either human users or active 
system components (i.e. self-acting services). The fact that 
there is a possible 1:n relation between a human user and a 
Subject (i.e. a user having more than one identity) is not 
explicitly modeled here as it is not relevant for the definition 
of access control. Users having more than one identity 
instantiate independent and different Subjects. Subjects are 
characterized by a defined amount of Subject Attributes. From 
the business perspective, Subjects act in the context of a 
Business Role. In our model, the concept of Business Role 
relates to a defined amount of (finer-grained) Subject 
Attributes. Role Hierarchies can be defined as well, all 
together finally mapping to a set of Subject Attributes. We do 
not focus directly on (business) roles for access control so 
there is no association between Business Role and Permission. 
This is a major difference to RBAC as defined by [5]. 
Furthermore it is possible to derive Subject Attributes from the 
role concept of RBAC: either the role itself can be defined as a 
single Subject Attribute carrying the role’s name as the value 
or it can map to a set of Subject Attributes; Permission then 
links towards these Subject Attributes. This is both a major 
difference to RBAC as we do not link the permission to a 
(coarse-grained) Business Role but to a combination of Subject 
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Attributes as well as to the ABAC approach where the 
(business) role is explicitly not in focus. We call the 
composition of all Permissions for one specific Object (which 
is in our case a Web Service Operation) Policy; so the 
authorization of each Object is defined using exactly one 
Policy. One goal of SOA is the reuse of existing services in 
different contexts. This is why we use the concept of 
Permission; each Permission covers one service usage context. 
The Policy is the composition of all Permissions of an Object 
using Boolean “OR” concatenation. 
A major advantage of our metamodel is that we remove the 
commonly used type of operation (e.g. read, write) [5] while 
placing the Input Parameters of the Web Service Operation 
into focus. So there are two relations from the Permission 
towards the Object: a direct one towards the Input Parameter 
(not backwards navigable) following the idea that a Parameter 
does not need to know if its value is evaluated for access 
control and an indirect one via the Policy. 
Service composition is one goal of service-oriented 
architecture. This is why we explicitly address it in our 
metamodel. A Composition of Web Services consists of 
multiple invocations of other Web Service Operations in a 
specific order [22]. It has a web service interface like the basic 
web services consisting of operations. It can not be determined 
if the service interface is a composite or a basic web service. 
But service composition relates to access control in respect 
that there should be the possibility to pre-verify authorization 
at the layer of composite web services to be able to stop 
execution in case of missing authorization at an early stage. 
The composition aspect, modeled as an association class of the 
aggregation of Web Service Operations in figure 2, enables the 
authorization verification even at a composition level. For all 
Web Service Operations that are obligatorily invoked by the 
Composition, their Policies have to be added to the (overall) 
Policy of the Composition of Web Service using Boolean 
“AND” concatenation. 
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF A WSOA-AWARE 
AUTHORIZATION VERIFICATION SERVICE 
The access control metamodel formally specifies the sets 
and relations that are used to model permissions for access 
control in concrete scenarios – the permissions are used to 
calculate an authorization verification decision. In this section 
we propose how to map this access control model to a WSOA-
aware authorization verification service. 
The challenge can be divided into three parts: first of all, 
the definition of the service interface towards WSOA’s core 
concern part; secondly, the development of the business logic 
which implements the functionality behind the service 
interfaces. Last but not least, it is to be specified where and 
how to store the data which is needed to verify authorization. 
Which data repositories already exist in WSOA and how to 
integrate them with the IdM architecture must be taken into 
consideration. To describe our setup, we use a middle-out 
approach beginning at the service interfaces following the IdM 
data layer and finally describing the business logic. Our focus 
is on authorization verification, so we neglect the 
authentication and administration part of the IdM architecture. 
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Figure 3. WSOA-aware IdM Architecture 
Focusing Authorization Verification 
 
A. Service Interface Definition 
In the following we outline the central operation of the 
authorization service using WSDL 1.1 [23]. 
<definitions name="Authorization" ...> 
  <types> 
     <!-- Definition of char, string, ArrayOfChar, 
          ArrayOfString -->  
  </types> 
 
  <message name="AuthZ_Msg_Req"> 
    <part name="security_token" type="ArrayOfChar" /> 
    <part name="object_id" type="string" /> 
    <part name="input_parameters" type="ArrayOfString" /> 
  </message> 
  <message name="AuthZ_Msg_Resp"> 
    <part name="result" element="boolean" /> 
  </message> 
 
  <portType name="Authorization_SOAP"> 
    <operation name="Authorization_Verification"> 
      <input message="AuthZ_Msg_Req" /> 
      <output message="AuthZ_Msg_Resp" /> 
    <operation> 
  </portType> 
 
  <binding ... /> 
  <service name="Authorization" ... /> 
</definitions> 
We concentrate on the definition of the messages that are 
exchanged. The incoming message carries the subject’s 
security token, which speaking very generally is an array of 8-
bit characters. The object identifier is required as well; we put 
it to the type of string as not in all scenarios are the identifiers 
only numeric. The input parameters of the web service 
International Conference on Software Engineering Advances(ICSEA 2007)
0-7695-2937-2/07 $25.00  © 2007
operation are sent as an array of strings. The message response 
carries the decision of the authorization verification request as 
a Boolean value. 
The authorization verification service can be called by any 
application server as depicted in figure 1. According to the 
access control metamodel, inside the application servers 
nothing has to be evaluated, only the input parameter of the 
invoked web service operation along with the caller’s security 
token have to be combined with the web service operation’s 
(unique) object identifier and sent to the authorization service. 
The return value is a Boolean value (true/false). This enables 
efficiency through separations of concerns for WSOA’s core 
concern part. It can be called from both composite (i.e. BPEL) 
and basic web services. 
B. Data Repositories 
1) User Directory 
The user directory stores information about subjects and 
their attributes according to our access control model. There 
are many ways of implementing a user directory besides a 
single-system approach, like meta directories, virtual 
directories or a directory replication network. This is not the 
focus of this publication; we assume that the business logic 
can access the data. Subjects are assigned a unique identifier 
to be able to distinguish them. During authentication, a 
subject’s credentials are verified and a time-limited security 
token is returned that is piggybacked with every web service 
operation call. 
2) Policy Store 
Web service operations can be reused in different scenarios. 
As a consequence, an access policy of an object is usually a 
combination of permissions of the individual access contexts. 
To enable efficient authorization verification, we suggest 
aggregating the permissions for each object using a disjunctive 
normal form (DNF). DNF is a standardization of a logical 
formula which is a disjunction of conjunctive clauses. The 
conjunctive clauses are the context-sensitive permissions and 
the disjunction (represented by a Boolean OR) concatenates 
the different contexts. An access policy is stored as a pair of 
object identifier and the DNF-style expression. 
3) Service Registry 
When developing an IdM architecture, the link to WSOA’s 
service registry should not be neglected. Here all information 
about WSOA’s services, both composite and basic, is stored. 
The goal is to extend this existing data store by adding a 
unique object identifier to each of WSOA’s web service 
operations at deployment. This is the object identifier which is 
used in the policy store to add the access policies to each web 
service operation. 
C. Business Logic 
The component handling authorization verification is 
usually called policy decision point (PDP). The PDP does the 
verification if a subject is allowed to invoke a web service 
operation. First of all, the access policy for the object is 
retrieved from the policy store. As the PDP does not receive 
the subject’s identifier itself but the subject’s (temporary) 
security token, there has to be a lookup, if the token is valid 
and which subject it can be mapped to. The mapping is done 
towards the subject’s identifier. Then the subject attributes and 
the environment attributes defined in the policy are obtained 
and finally the policy is evaluated to a Boolean value. 
D. Bridging the Gap Towards WSOA’s Core Concerns 
The IdM architecture needs to be linked to WSOA’s core 
concern part consisting of basic and composite web services. 
The question where to put the policy enforcement point (PEP) 
which invokes the authorization verification service has 
already been discussed in [24]. Considering the architecture of 
web service-oriented architecture as depicted in figure 1, the 
PEPs are put as distinctive components into each application 
server, both the ones hosting basic web services as well as 
those hosting BPEL engines which provide support for 
composite web services. This enables each of the components 
implementing a single web service operation to do a call to the 
applications server’s local PEP which handles the 
communication with the PDP. 
V. IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE 
In this section we exemplarily present how we put our 
access control model and authorization verification service 
into practice within an integration project being pursued at our 
university. 
A. Case Study 
In our case study, we focus on two different applications 
which are used to generate certificates in the university 
context, so called transcripts of records (ToR). One of these 
two systems is SAP R/3 Campus Management, the other one 
is a HIS system. Both are commonly used at European 
universities. The starting point, depicted on the left side of 
figure 4, had already been implemented: ToR generation is 
implemented as a BPEL process using Oracle SOA Suite with 
Oracle BPEL process manager. The wrapping to web services 
of the SAP and HIS systems had been done using JBoss 
Application Server and BEA Weblogic. At each application 
server, a policy enforcement point (PEP) following the “secure 
service agent” design pattern is installed handling the 
communication towards the authorization service [24]. 
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Figure 4. Case Study: Securing BPEL-composed 
Generation of Transcript of Records 
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Now the challenge is to derive the policies for the 
generation of a transcript of records (ToR). First, we start with 
an informal description. We assume that there are (at least) 
two different usage contexts: 
 
• A student wants to get a ToR. He is only allowed to get 
his own ToR. 
• A student counselor needs a ToR for consultation. He is 
allowed to get the ToR of any student. 
 
<<Subject>>
StudentUser
<<Identifier>> id: String
<<Security Token>> token: String
<<SubjectAttribute>> matriculation: String
<<SubjectAttribute>> role: String
…
<<Web Service Operation>>
FetchExamResults
<<Identifier>> object ID: String
<<InputParameter>> matriculation: 
String
<<Permission>>
StudentPermission
StudentUser.matriculation ==
FetchExamResults.matriculation
AND
StudentUser.role == “Student”
<<Permission>>
CounselorPermission
CounselorUser.role == “Counselor”
<<Policy>>
FetchExamResultsPolicy
<<Subject>>
CounselorUser
<<Identifier>> id: String
<<Security Token>> token: String
<<SubjectAttribute>> role: String
…
<<Business Role>>
Student
<<Business Role>>
Counselor
 
Figure 5. Exemplary Access Control Model 
for ToR Generation 
 
In figure 5 we exemplarily show how this informal model is 
depicted as a UML model at M1 level using our access control 
metamodel. On the right hand side, there is a basic web 
service operation, which retrieves exam results for the 
matriculation number that is handed over. Each web service 
operation has a unique object identifier. As it is used in two 
contexts, there are two permissions that are explicitly modeled 
and combined in the policy. The first context depicts a Student 
who tries to execute this operation; than the StudentPermission 
is evaluated. In case a Counselor tries to get access, the 
CounselorPermission is verified. The combination of both 
Permissions forms the Policy which is attached to the Web 
Service Operation. 
 
Now we place this model into a real world system. The 
signature of the web service interface of the ToR generating 
service (which is BPEL-composed) is quite simple, just the 
matriculation number is needed for which the ToR should be 
generated. The name of the operation’s input parameter is 
‘matriculation’. In our implementation, we use “s” as 
abbreviation for “subject” and “param” for “input parameter”. 
Environment state attributes like date or time can be accessed 
using “esa”. Following the “secure service agent” design 
pattern, the parameter carrying the subject’s security token is 
automatically added to the operation’s signature. When the 
web service is published in the service registry, an object 
identifier is assigned for each operation. This identifier is then 
used in the policy store to enable a quick lookup for the 
policy. 
 
Object ID Access Policy 
… … 
14 ((s. role == ‘Student’ AND s.matriculation == 
param.matriculation) 
OR 
(s.role == ‘Counselor’)) 
… … 
19 TRUE 
… … 
165 ((s. role == ‘Student’ AND s.matriculation == 
param.matriculation) 
OR 
(s.role == ‘Counselor’)) 
 
AND 
 
TRUE 
… … 
Table 1. Executable Policies  
 
Table 1 shows an extract of our policy store. Three policies 
are needed for the generation of the ToR: object id 14 is the 
basic web service operation retrieving exam results for a 
defined matriculation number. Object id 19 corresponds to the 
web service operation obtaining lecture information – this is 
allowed for everyone which results in a policy directly relating 
to TRUE. Object 165 is the BPEL process which is assigned 
(at least) the same policies of the invoked operations. 
Additionally, further constraints can be added. We used a 
MySQL database to store the policies and a Java-based PDP 
(stateless session bean running on JBoss AS) for the 
calculation. 
B. Performance Evaluation 
For performance evaluation of our approach we compare the 
BPEL-based ToR generation with and without authorization 
verification. For automated testing we used Parasoft’s 
SOAtest™ [25]. We put the BPEL-Process ToR on one 
machine running Windows 2003 Server with Oracle BPEL 
Process Manager 10.1.3, the two basic web services wrapping 
the legacy systems were put on two different machines both 
running SuSE Linux 10.1 and JBoss Application Server 4.0.5.  
 
Measured Object Min Avg Max 
BPEL-Process ToR (w/o AuthZ) 391 860 2644 
Basic Web Service 1 (w/o AuthZ) 125 152 921 
Basic Web Service 2 (w/o AuthZ) 31 47 797 
 
BPEL-Process ToR (with AuthZ) 553 1026 2838 
Basic Web Service 1 (with AuthZ) 172 203 1207 
Basic Web Service 2 (with AuthZ) 73 92 810 
Table 2. Performance Measurement (in Milliseconds) 
 
We measured two different scenarios, each of them having 
three targets. The first scenario was without authorization 
verification. The second was done with authorization 
verification thereby illustrating how time consuming this can 
be. The three targets are the complete BPEL process 
(including the basic web service calls) and two basic web 
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services individually. We measured the runtime from the 
service invocation until the response message was returned. 
 
We calculated that most of the values are close to the 
average, the standard deviation was minimal in all six cases. 
The few outliners result in higher network traffic. That is why 
we concentrate on the average values. Web service 1 is 
connected to an SAP R/3 system which resides on another 
system whilst web service 2 is directly connected to the 
database of the HIS system. This is the reason for the 
difference in average execution times of approximately 100 
ms. The performance measurement reveals that the additional 
call to the authorization verification service costs an average 
of 50 ms per call. For the entire BPEL process this results in 
150 ms as there are three calls altogether – which is a surplus 
in processing time of 20%. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper we presented an approach how to handle 
authorization verification in web service-oriented architecture 
(WSOA). Therefore we designed an access control metamodel 
which enhances existing models to better suit the requirements 
of WSOA. We used this access control metamodel for the 
development of an authorization verification service which is 
part of the identity management architecture. We illustrated 
how it is linked with WSOA’s core concern part and 
demonstrated the feasibility of our approach in a case study. 
Our next steps concerning identity management for WSOA 
are to consider a conjoint and model-driven development of 
WSOA’s core concern services with their associated access 
policies. Starting from computational independent models at 
the business process level, they can be derived to platform 
independent models and transformed to platform specific 
models (i.e. IdM architecture-specific) which are effective 
calculable policies. To enable interoperability, we will attempt 
the alignment of our approach with OASIS’s eXtensible 
Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [26]. 
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